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SUMMARY
Recent takeovers – and attempted takeovers – of strategic resource companies have
renewed concerns that some of Canada’s prized corporate players are falling into foreign
hands. However, data shows that Canada has not been a significant attractor of
multinational investment, lagging behind a number of developed and developing nations.
Indeed, since the mid-1990s, Canada has been a net exporter of capital in world markets,
as foreign direct investment by Canadian companies far outpaced the inflow of foreign
capital. Rather than being hollowed out, we are hollowing out other countries. 
As a general policy, Canada should reduce barriers to foreign direct investment and
welcome our growing role in international markets. As many studies have shown, foreign
direct investment brings significant net benefits to the Canadian economy, including
knowledge transfers, new management, better wages and productivity.  
Only in limited circumstances, such as in the case of protecting Canada’s national security,
should Canada block foreign takeovers of Canadian companies.   
In the interest of neutrality and minimizing economic distortions, takeovers of Canadian
companies by foreign sovereign wealth funds or state-owned enterprises should be
reviewed on a case-by-case basis. When state-owned enterprises have similar commercial
objectives and operate on a level-playing field without financial support by state owners,
they could also provide net benefits to the Canadian economy.
One important area that requires further consideration is with respect to the tax-exempt
status of sovereign wealth funds and state-owned companies. Canadian tax treaties
should be reviewed to ensure that Canadian withholding taxes maintain an even playing
field among private and state-owned businesses operating in Canada.
* Doctoral Student in Economics and Palmer Chair of Public Policy, School of Public Policy. We wish to thank
David Bercuson, Jason Langrish and Colin Robertson for helpful comments.  
1INTRODUCTION
A sharp increase in foreign investment in Canada in 2007 revived historic concerns that foreign
corporations are increasing their influence in, and taking advantage of, our domestic markets.
These fears were also prevalent during the technology boom at the tail end of 2000 that
resulted in a few significant takeovers of Canadian companies, a trend that proved to be short
lived. 
Now, several years later, we are seeing a similar influx of foreign investment in Canada
focused on natural resources. However, even in these brief periods of inflows of capital,
Canada has not been a significant attractor of multinational investment, lagging behind a
number of developed and developing nations — a point we raised two years ago.1
At the same time, Canada continues to gain strength as a capital exporter, with outbound
investment flows surpassing inbound foreign direct investment. Several Canadian companies
are international players, including Agrium Inc., Barrick Gold Corp., Brookfield Asset
Management Inc., Power Corp., Manulife Financial Corp., Nexen Inc., Research in Motion
Ltd., Suncor Energy Inc. and Thomson Reuters Corp., to name a few.  Another significant
Canadian multinational, Potash Corp., is now the target of a hostile takeover attempt by BHP
Billiton PLC, one of the largest mining companies in the world. As part of the drama, a ‘white
knight’ could appear, and the speculation is that it is likely to be a Chinese state-owned
enterprise.
Canada is in a quandary. Our lacklustre record in attracting foreign direct investment reduces
competition in Canadian markets for investment and talent that comes along with new
management. Meanwhile, Canadians are reaping economic benefits from involvement in
international markets. All this suggests that Canada should look at its policies to deepen our
global attractiveness and make sure that we are open to inbound and outbound capital flows.
Recent tax changes that have reduced Canada’s corporate income tax rate and withholding tax
on interest paid to non-residents help attract investment as well as grow Canadian
multinationals.
With emerging markets becoming an increasing source of international investment, many state
owned enterprises and sovereign wealth funds are buying assets in Canada, a phenomenon that
is not new but becoming more important than in the recent past. In some cases, state-owned
enterprises have played an important role in growing Canada’s industrial base, including
several in the resource sector such as Statoil ASA (majority-owned by the Norwegian
government), Abu Dhabi National Energy Co. (also known as TAQA), Korea National Oil
Corp., PetroChina Investment Co. and some previously state-owned enterprises like BP PLC,
Total SA and Canada’s own Petro-Canada.  
In some cases, the government has already taken action to protect Canada’s interest. When
MacDonald-Dettwiler and Associates Ltd. was involved in a takeover, Canada blocked the sale
for national security reasons. The company did have technology, Radarsat 2 satellite, that could
serve an important role in national defence and Canada was reluctant to let a United States
company control it.  
1 Matt Krzepkowski and Jack M. Mintz (2008), Squeaky Hinges: Widening the Door to Canadian Cross-border
Investment, No. 69, E-brief, C.D. Howe Institute. 
2A key issue addressed in this paper is whether some state-owned enterprises might have non-
commercial objectives or financial advantages in acquisition markets due to subsidies or tax
benefits that provide a competitive advantage or an ability to outbid taxable commercially
oriented entities. In our view, Canada should make sure a level playing field exists among
companies in takeover markets so that Canadian companies are operated by the most able as
determined by market decisions, not simply those with an advantage due to government
support. This is especially important in Canada’s resource sector, so Canadians, as owners,
benefit from bringing in the best private producers to maximize rents.  
As a general rule, Canada should welcome foreign takeovers and take advantage of our
growing role in international capital markets. However, there are some instances when Canada
should review, on a case-by-case basis, takeovers when they compromise national security or
operate at an unfair advantage as state-owned enterprises. Some review of our tax laws may be
needed to ensure that companies operate at a level-playing field.
CANADA’S MEDIOCRE RECORD OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INFLOWS
About a fifth of business assets in Canada are controlled by foreigners, with roughly 60 percent
of foreign control emanating from the United States.2 Measuring inflows of foreign direct
investment (FDI) as a percentage of GDP, Canada ranked 26th out of 92 countries during the
recent boom in 2007.3 More crucially, this temporary boom of inflows has since waned and
inflows have declined back down to normal levels (Figure 1) due to falling commodity prices,
a stronger Canadian dollar and a recessionary global economy. Our rank has also declined.
Using five-year averages of investment flows, a more indicative measure of overall standing
due to the large year-to-year fluctuations in investment flows, Canada ranked 46th for the
period 2004-2008, dropping from a rank of 33rd during the 1999-2003 period (see Table 1), or
about the same rank as a decade ago. This is not just about Canada lagging behind developing
nations that may have positioned themselves to attract investment due to a lack of sufficient
human and capital resources to develop their own industrial sectors. Canada ranks 14th out of
30 OECD countries in our sample from 2004-2008, although second in the G7.  
2 Statistics Canada, Business Performance and Ownernship, (Ottawa, 2007),
http://www41.statcan.gc.ca/2007/2239/ceb2239_000_e.htm.  
3 Direct investment abroad (net outflows) and foreign direct investment (net inflows) in the reporting economy
represent the change in the assets owned by investors in a country for cross-border investments.  Direct investment
includes equity capital, reinvested earnings, other capital and financial derivatives associated with various inter-
company transactions between affiliated enterprises that are at least 10 percent owned by the parent.  Excluded are
flows of direct investment capital for exceptional financing such as debt-for-equity swaps.  See International
Monetary Fund’s Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (Sixth edition, 2009).
3FIGURE 1: Ratio of FDI Inflows to GDP for Selected Countries and Country Groups, 
(Based on Groups' Total Inflows and GDP)
SOURCES: FDI flows: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, September, 2010;
GDP: World Bank, World Development Indicators, July 2010. 
TABLE 1: Country Ranking by the Ratio of Foreign Direct Investment Net Inflows and Net Outflows 
as a Percentage of GDP (Averaged over 2004-2008 for 92 Countries)
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1 Luxembourg (2) 282.67 1 322.16 1 604.83 0
2 Hong Kong (3) 23.42 3 23.91 3 47.32 0
3 Hungary 24.38 2 21.61 4 45.99 27
4 Iceland 9.70 16 24.78 2 34.48 30
5 Belgium (2) 16.56 7 15.77 5 32.33 2
6 Singapore 16.29 8 12.30 7 28.59 -1
7 Bulgaria 20.90 4 0.62 54 21.51 18
8 Austria 9.82 15 11.65 8 21.47 31
9 Seychelles 17.31 5 1.56 34 18.87 10
10 Bahrain 10.31 13 8.05 9 18.37 16
11 Estonia 12.02 12 5.36 18 17.39 9
12 Switzerland 4.46 44 12.84 6 17.30 -2
13 Cyprus 10.05 14 6.74 12 16.78 0
14 Jordan 15.31 10 0.17 68 15.48 23
15 Macao (4) 17.13 6 0.90 46 18.03 13
16 Azerbaijan 7.31 22 5.71 17 13.01 -13
17 Netherlands 4.88 39 8.03 10 12.92 -11
18 Malta 15.36 9 0.12 74 15.48 -7
Rank Country or FDI Rank By FDI Rank By Sum of Change
by FDI Area Name Inflows Inflows Outflows Outflows Inflows and in
Sum Outflows Rank (1)
(% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of GDP)
cont’d
4TABLE 1: cont’d
19 Georgia 12.23 11 -0.07 89 12.16 19
20 Sweden 5.15 37 6.61 14 11.76 -12
21 United Kingdom 5.45 32 5.83 16 11.28 -9
22 Israel 5.34 35 5.02 20 10.36 18
23 Spain 3.27 51 6.47 15 9.74 -8
24 Chile 7.00 24 2.33 30 9.32 -7
25 Fiji 9.23 17 0.01 83 9.24 51
26 Solomon Islands 8.04 20 0.85 48 8.89 65
27 Kazakhstan 8.65 18 0.01 82 8.66 -9
28 Republic of Moldova 8.11 19 0.15 69 8.26 7
29 France 2.95 54 5.04 19 8.00 -13
30 Jamaica 7.20 23 0.72 49 7.92 -3
31 Malaysia 3.66 47 4.10 22 7.76 13
32 Canada 3.78 46 3.98 23 7.75 -9
33 Romania 7.44 21 0.14 70 7.58 29
34 Croatia 6.18 28 0.89 47 7.07 -5
35 Kuwait 0.12 91 6.69 13 6.81 57
36 Latvia 5.90 30 0.91 45 6.81 14
37 Egypt 6.33 27 0.43 59 6.76 50
38 Cambodia 6.62 25 0.12 72 6.74 8
39 Honduras 6.58 26 -0.01 84 6.57 3
40 Czech Republic 5.37 34 0.98 44 6.36 -19
41 Ukraine 5.98 29 0.25 65 6.22 26
42 Costa Rica 5.83 31 0.31 61 6.14 15
43 Norway 1.06 85 4.94 21 6.00 -11
44 Russian Federation 3.21 52 2.64 26 5.85 20
45 Poland 4.52 41 1.22 38 5.74 11
46 Lithuania 4.49 43 1.17 39 5.65 5
47 Colombia 4.51 42 1.08 41 5.59 16
48 Uruguay 5.41 33 0.14 71 5.55 20
49 Tunisia 5.25 36 0.09 77 5.34 12
50 Portugal 2.40 64 2.52 27 4.92 -26
51 Macedonia (FYR) 4.93 38 -0.02 85 4.92 -18
52 Slovenia 2.48 63 2.43 28 4.91 8
53 Slovakia 4.53 40 0.30 62 4.83 -17
54 Thailand 4.10 45 0.58 55 4.68 -5
55 Denmark 1.40 79 3.21 25 4.61 -46
56 Barbados 2.94 55 1.66 33 4.60 27
57 Germany 1.25 82 3.25 24 4.51 -26
58 Finland 2.33 65 1.94 32 4.27 -44
59 Australia 2.84 57 1.26 36 4.10 -16
60 China 3.37 50 0.63 53 3.99 -6
61 El Salvador 3.51 48 0.26 63 3.77 8
62 United States 1.66 75 2.08 31 3.74 -10
Rank Country or FDI Rank By FDI Rank By Sum of Change
by FDI Area Name Inflows Inflows Outflows Outflows Inflows and in
Sum Outflows Rank(1)
(% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of GDP)
cont’d
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NOTES:
1. Change in rank is from the average values over the period 1999-2003.
2. The averages used for change in rank for Luxembourg and Belgium are over the period of 2002-2003. Prior to 2002,
the combined FDI inflows and outflows were reported for these countries. The Belgium-Luxembourg combined averages
over 1999-2003 for FDI inflows, outflows, and sum of inflows and outflows are equal to 50.6%, 54.6%, and 105.2% of
GDP, respectively.
3. Hong Kong is China’s Special Administrative Region.
4. Macao is China’s Special Administrative Region.
SOURCES OF DATA: FDI flows: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, September, 2010;
GDP: World Bank, World Development Indicators, July 2010.
63 Italy 1.35 80 2.38 29 3.73 2
64 Brazil 2.32 66 1.23 37 3.55 -17
65 Ireland -3.88 92 7.29 11 3.42 -61
66 Argentina 2.72 59 0.66 52 3.38 -11
67 Botswana 3.42 49 -0.05 88 3.37 -26
68 New Zealand 2.96 53 0.24 66 3.20 -10
69 Morocco 2.84 56 0.43 60 3.27 11
70 Mexico 2.53 61 0.57 56 3.11 -22
71 India 1.93 71 1.06 42 2.99 11
72 Pakistan 2.74 58 0.06 79 2.80 16
73 Mauritius 2.22 67 0.55 57 2.77 -2
74 Turkey 2.50 62 0.25 64 2.75 12
75 South Africa 1.69 73 0.71 50 2.40 -2
76 Philippines 1.62 76 0.71 51 2.33 -2
77 Benin 2.14 68 -0.05 87 2.09 -5
78 Greece 1.06 84 1.02 43 2.08 1
79 Togo 2.56 60 -0.51 92 2.05 -20
80 Belarus 2.04 69 0.01 81 2.05 -3
81 Niger 1.66 74 0.22 67 1.89 9
82 Namibia 1.96 70 -0.11 90 1.84 -1
83 Swaziland 1.76 72 -0.04 86 1.72 -38
84 Senegal 1.61 77 0.10 75 1.71 -9
85 Republic of Korea 0.59 88 1.11 40 1.69 -15
86 Sri Lanka 1.53 78 0.12 73 1.65 -8
87 Japan 0.22 90 1.43 35 1.65 -2
88 Bolivia 1.31 81 0.03 80 1.34 -66
89 Paraguay 1.19 83 0.07 78 1.26 -5
90 Venezuela 0.68 87 0.52 58 1.20 -37
91 Kenya 0.73 86 0.09 76 0.82 -2
92 Cameroon 0.54 89 -0.11 91 0.43 -26
Rank Country or FDI Rank By FDI Rank By Sum of Change
by FDI Area Name Inflows Inflows Outflows Outflows Inflows and in
Sum Outflows Rank(1)
(% of GDP) (% of GDP) (% of GDP)
6The decline in investment in 2008 can be seen prominently in recent mergers and acquisitions
(M&As) involving Canadian interests. Activity started to decline in the final quarter of 2007
and continued throughout much of 2008. Total M&As in Canada, which totalled $370 billion
in 2007, fell to $115 billion in 2008.4 The average number of transactions per quarter and the
total value of these transactions began increasing again during 2009. They are finally trending
around what we were experiencing prior to 2006.
Canada has always been a larger player in investment outflows. The only two periods in the
last 15 years in which it has been net importer of capital have been the two most recent
economic booms. Canada has remained above the OECD average in terms of outflows as
percentage of GDP almost entirely throughout the last 15 years and maintained sizeable
outflows going into 2008, before 2009 finally brought an expected decline in investment
abroad from Canadian firms (Figure 2). Unfortunately, Canada’s world ranking has still been
falling over the last 15 years. When taking the average net outflows for the periods 1999-2003
and 2004-2008, Canada’s rank has fallen from 16th to 23rd. 
FIGURE 2: Ratio of FDI Outflows to GDP for Selected Countries and Country Groups,  
(Based on Groups' Total Outflows and GDP)
SOURCES: FDI flows: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, September, 2010;
GDP: World Bank, World Development Indicators, July 2010.
To construct a measure of openness to investment we combine these two measures, providing
the sum of inflows and outflows as a percentage of GDP. Under this classification, Canada
ranks only 32nd out of 92 countries, behind countries such as the United Kingdom, Sweden,
Spain, and France.
4 All merger and acquisition statistics from Crosbie & Company Inc., various years.
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7While sitting at an average level in the world FDI/GDP rankings, Canada’s rank in potential
FDI, as measured by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), is
a lofty 11th in the world (of 141 countries), making Canada one of largest underperformers in
FDI inflows. This indicates either that Canadian flows are subject to different criteria than that
measured by the UN, or we are not living up to our potential.
This is not to say that Canada should become a conduit to attract as much FDI as possible.
Indeed, a number of the major nations rank somewhat low in our ratio of FDI/GDP despite
being pegged as attractive locations to FDI, including most of the G7. However, there are
additional benefits that a resource rich country like Canada may have from added international
capital and we should position ourselves to take advantage of these benefits without having to
run the risk of being ‘hollowed out’ by multinational corporations. As Canada is no longer as
reliant on manufacturing as has been in the past, having developed instead a reliance on natural
resources, we must be careful to ensure that the wealth from these resources is kept within our
borders, rather than allowing the exportation of rents. 
The growth of a number of developing nations that have become important players in
international trade and financial markets has altered the composition of countries investing in
Canada, which presents new challenges. Though the United States remains Canada’s largest
trade partner as well as source of FDI, these shares have been falling over time. Whereas
69 percent of our stock of foreign investment originated from the United States in 1987, this
stock has fallen to 52 percent in 2009, with Europe taking most of this slack, growing from
22 percent to 35 percent, and Asian markets increasing their share more slowly, from 5 percent
to 9 percent.
WHY CANADA SHOULD BE OPEN TO FDI
The most common arguments against increased foreign investment have centred on the
potential of foreign investment ‘crowding out’ domestic investment. There are also concerns
FDI has a negative effect on a nation’s balance of payments due to an increase in demand of
capital and intermediate goods. The research on crowding effects of foreign investment has
yielded mixed results, with some supporting crowding in5 and some crowding out,6 though
none of these correlations come close to providing proof of causation. Similarly, dissecting a
causal relationship between FDI and the balance of payments is difficult7 and Canada’s
generally strong current account balance suggests this is not a compelling case.
5 Barry Bosworth and Susan Collins (1999), Capital Flows to Developing Economies: Implications for Saving and
Investment, in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 30(1), 143-180.
6 Bruce A. Blonigan and Miao G. Wang (Washington, D.C., 2005), Inappropriate Pooling of Wealthy and Poor
Countries in Empirical FDI Studies, in T. Moran, E.Graham, E., M. Blomstrom (Eds.), Does Foreign Direct
Investment Promote Development? Institute for International Economics, 221–243.
7 Gary, Hufbauer, Darius Lakdawalla and Anup Malani (New York and Geneva, 1994), Determinants of Direct Foreign
Investment and Its Connection To Trade, in UNCTAD Review.
8Further objections to increased foreign control have focused on differences in the strength of
corporate governance in foreign countries and on concerns that while domestic firms operate in
the domestic interest, foreign companies do not. Corporations newly formed via mergers and
acquisitions may be subject to host country governance laws, something that has been largely
seen as a potential benefit to developing nations, but could hurt the makeup of corporations in
developed nations that are acquired by firms subject to weaker corporate laws. These fears
have few legs to stand on, with little evidence that increased globalization has had an effect on
corporate governance, due to the strength of local interests of host countries.8 There is also no
basis to claims that firms from nations with less stable institutions gain, or attempt to gain, an
advantage from investing in countries with better corporate standards. 
Other popular criticisms of foreign direct investment include that it leads to a lack of research
and development, low productivity, few linkages to the rest of the economy and to a transfer of
headquarter functions abroad, resulting in a reduced stake in the community through charitable
contributions. Little evidence has been provided to buttress these arguments. One important
study9 found that foreign-controlled companies created more head offices in Canada than
Canadian-controlled companies, undertook more research and development in Canada, had
higher productivity rates and paid higher wages. Their knowledge-based activities also
contributed to better performance by Canadian-controlled companies linked to them.  
Thus, there are significant potential benefits realized by allowing investment into Canada as
recognized by the Competition Policy Review Panel.10 If a foreign corporation chooses to
invest in a market, as opposed to export or arrange license agreements, it is generally assumed
they exhibit at least one of the oft-cited ‘OLI’ advantages (Ownership, Location,
Internalization) over domestic firms.11 These advantages manifest themselves in foreign
multinational firms continually showing to be more productive than their competition, in both
labour and total factor productivity due to technological advantages, returns to scale, or higher
capital intensities.12 This does not result in more efficient foreign firms forcing out domestic
firms, as the technological advantages of large multinationals have spillover impacts on
domestic firms,13 which lead to increased labour productivity and higher wages for workers.14
8 Tarun Khanna, Joe Kogan and Krishna Palepu (2006), Globalization and Similarities in Corporate Governance: A
Cross-Country Analysis, in The Review of Economics and Statistics, 88(1), 69-90.
9 John Baldwin and Guy Gellatly (Ottawa, 2007), Global Links: Multinationals in Canada: An Overview of Research
at Statistics Canada, in Canadian Economy in Transition Series, Statistics Canada.
10 Competition Review Panel, Industry Canada (Ottawa, 2008), Compete to Win.
11 John H. Dunning, American Investment in British Manufacturing Industry, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958).
12 Robert E. Lipsey, Home and Host Country Effects of FDI, No 9293, in NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of
Economic Research (2002).
13 Mangus Blomstrom and Ari Kokko (1998), Multinational Corporations and Spillovers, in Journal of Economic
Surveys, 12(3), 247-277.
14 Zadia Feliciano and Robert E. Lipsey, Foreign Ownership and Wages in the United States, 1987 - 1992, No 6923,
NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, (1999). See also David Figlio and Bruce A.
Blonigen (2000), The Effects of Foreign Direct Investment on Local Communities, in Journal of Urban Economics,
48(2), 338-363.
9These benefits are not restricted to firms investing and transferring technology to less
developed countries. In fact, technological spillover effects may be greater for industries that
require more skilled labour and where the technological differences between domestic firms
and foreign firms are smaller, indicating FDI inflows may be more beneficial for developed
countries such as Canada.15
Overall, there is much to gain from foreign direct investment. Given Canada has been a net
capital exporter since the mid-1990s, it would be odd for Canada to shut its doors to foreign
investors while our own companies are successfully competing abroad.
IMPORTANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE AND SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS IN
FDI: IS THE PLAYING FIELD EVEN?
With many emerging countries experiencing strong growth, resulting in substantial capital funds
that could be deployed anywhere in the world, state-owned enterprises are playing a prominent
role in foreign acquisition markets. A number of important mergers have taken place involving
state-owned enterprises, including companies from advanced G-20 countries like France and
Korea and emerging economies such as China and the Middle East. As we illustrate in Table 2,
many global acquisitions of over $1 billion have involved resource companies in 2009.
TABLE 2: Cross-border M&A deals worth over $1 billion completed in 2009 involving wholly or partly-owned 
State-Owned Enterprises
SOURCE: UNCTAD, World Investment Report (2010)
15 Magnus Blomstrom, Ari Kokko and Steven Globerman (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), The Determinants of Host
Country Spillovers From Foreign Direct Investment: A Review and Synthesis of the Literature, in N. Pain (Ed.),
Inward Investment, Technological Change and Growth, 34–65.
16.9 British Energy Group PLC Electricité de France International SA (EDF) France
9.6 Volkswagen AG Qatar Investment Authority Qatar
7.2 Addax Petroleum Corp Sinopec International China
6.1 Nuon NV Vattenfall AB Sweden
4.5 Constellation Energy Nuclear Group LLC Electricité de France International SA (EDF) France
4.4 Cia Espanola de Petroleos SA International Petroleum Investment Co UAE
3.9 Harvest Energy Trust Korea National Oil Corp (KNOC) South Korea
3.9 Chartered Semiconductor Manufacturing Ltd Advanced Technology Investment Co LLC UAE
2.9 Advanced Micro Devices Inc Advanced Technology Investment Co LLC UAE
2.8 Felix Resources Ltd Yanzhou Coal Mining Co Ltd China
2.0 Ternium Sidor Corporacion Venezolana de Guayana Venezuela
1.6 OOO SeverEnergia OAO “Gazprom” Russia
1.4 OZ Minerals Ltd China Minmetals Nonferrous Metals Co Ltd China
1.3 ProLogis (China Operations) GIC Real Estate Pte Ltd Singapore
1.2 Singapore Petroleum Co Ltd PetroChina International (Singapore)Pte Ltd China
1.2 Rompetrol Group NV AO Natsionalnaya Kompaniya Kazakhstan
1.1 Oil Search Ltd International Petroleum Investment Co UAE
1.1 Banco de Venezuela SAICA Republic of Venezuela Venezuela
1.0 Singapore Petroleum Co Ltd PetroChina International (Singapore)Pte Ltd China
1.0 Sibir Energy PLC OAO Gazprom Neft Russia
Value Acquired company Acquiring company State
($B)
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Acquisitions made by state-owned enterprises are not a new trend – there have been many
instances in the past whereby sovereign wealth funds or, more typically, state-owned
enterprises have bought up foreign companies when operating at a global scale. Some well-
known energy companies that were once owned by governments include BP (privatized in
1987), France’s Elf Aquitaine (privatized in 1994), Petro-Canada (privatization completed in
2004), and Norway’s Statoil (still state-controlled). Many participated in developing Canada’s
natural resource economy.
When state-owned enterprises operate on the same basis as privately owned companies,
decisions are based on commercial criteria. To acquire foreign companies or invest in
greenfield projects, a state-owned enterprise would have no distinctive non-economic
advantage compared to other companies, thereby raising little concern for policy. However,
state-controlled companies might benefit from government subsidies, low-cost loans and/or
tax-exempt status that provides them a competitive edge in markets. State-owned enterprises
might be in position to acquire companies not because of superior management skills but
because they rely on government support.
Governments could block outright foreign takeovers by state-owned enterprises over fears that
state-owned companies have public-supported advantages. Canada recently blocked the
takeover of MacDonald Dettwiler on the grounds that the current Investment Canada Act
requires takeovers to be evaluated in terms of their net benefit. Presumably, a takeover by a
foreign state-owned enterprise that provides no economic benefits but leads to poor financial
performance and tax avoidance might be viewed as failing the ‘net benefit’ test. Takeovers
could be blocked on these grounds.
Yet, it is not clear that the best policy is to simply block state-owned enterprises from
takeovers given that new foreign companies operating in Canada could eventually improve
industrial performance through competition that is nearly impossible to predict accurately.
Policies should aim to ensure that a level playing-field is achieved instead. 
For example, the tax-exempt status of foreign sovereign wealth funds and state-owned
enterprises can provide them an advantage that enables these entities to outbid Canadian
companies on the presumption that most Canadian corporate tax can be avoided. This can be
achieved by restructuring Canadian businesses so that most payments made to the state-owned
entity are exempt from tax in the non-resident country but are deductible expenses in Canada.
Under treaty arrangements, the income paid to the parent may bear some but little Canadian
withholding tax. Canadian policy could be revised to ensure that favourable withholding tax
rates are not negotiated in these instances when related-party transactions are involved.
Alternatively, certain types of deductions taken in Canada could be disallowed to ensure
corporate tax is paid. While this would put foreign state-owned companies on a level playing
field with taxable Canadian companies, it might also be necessary to adjust tax policies with
respect to other tax-exempt entities operating in Canada as well as foreign investors who
employ tax-efficient structures to avoid Canadian tax.   
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THE CASE OF RESOURCE INDUSTRIES
One special consideration is with respect to non-renewable extractive industries. In Canada,
resources are owned by the state, so effectively a private company invited to extract resources
serves as a partner with the state. Representing its citizens, governments have a responsibility
to make sure that resource rents, which are collected from the royalties and taxes paid by
producers, are maximised.   
In principle, provincial governments, as owners of the non-renewable resources, might wish to
have some say in determining partners to extract resources. Presumably, the province would
like to maximize economic rents and therefore welcome foreign takeovers if they improve
management and profitability. As long as bidders have no special subsidy or tax advantages,
then the takeover market helps ensure that governments get the most able producers as partners
in resource development.
The recent case of BHP Billiton’s proposed hostile takeover of Potash Corp. is a good
illustration of this principle. Without doubt, BHP is a successful corporation and its willingness
to offer a higher price for Potash’s shares, compared to the market prices that existed prior to
the takeover announcement, implies that the existing owners would be able to share in profits
that would be generated by better operational efficiency after the takeover. However, if BHP
were able to acquire the company only because it had government financial support, then the
Saskatchewan government could be concerned that it might lose economic benefits that would
be generated by Potash Corp.’s activities in the province.  
Our interest is not to judge whether the BHP price is appropriate or not – markets will
eventually make that determination. However, given Canada’s mediocre FDI performance,
there seems little case for the government, as opposed to the shareholders, to block BHP
Billiton’s acquisition of Potash Corp. Should such a move result in a state-owned enterprise
buying up Potash Corp. for an even higher price, the Government of Saskatchewan might be
concerned about whether it derives top economic rents from production taking place in the
province. This outcome could also undermine investment performance in Canada as well
potentially hurt relations with other countries where our own companies are investing.
CONCLUSIONS
Canada is far from being hollowed out as often claimed when foreign investors acquire
Canadian companies. The evidence does not support that foreign direct investment in Canada is
large. If anything, Canada is an underperformer.  
Instead, Canada is a net capital exporter with our own successful domestic companies
operating at a global scale. Rather than being hollowed out, we are hollowing out other
countries.
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In our view, foreign direct investment provides positive benefits to the Canadian economy and
should therefore be encouraged rather than blocked, except in special circumstances. In
particular, takeovers of Canadian companies by foreign state-owned enterprises might raise
some concern if foreign governments provide special support to the state-owned enterprise that
puts it in an advantageous market position. The aim of Canadian policy is to try to make sure
that all companies, regardless of ownership, operate under a level playing field rather than
simply blocking foreign companies operating in Canada.
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